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Many aspects of religious rituals suggest they provide adaptive benefits.
Studies across societies consistently find that investments in ritual behaviour
return high levels of cooperation. Another line of research finds that allopar-
ental support to mothers increases maternal fertility and improves child
outcomes. Although plausible, whether religious cooperation extends to
alloparenting and/or affects child development remains unclear. Using
10 years of data collected from the Avon Longitudinal Study of Parents
and Children (ALSPAC), we test the predictions that church attendance
is positively associated with social support and fertility (n = 8207 to n =
8209), and that social support is positively associated with fertility and
child development (n = 1766 to n = 6561). Results show that: (i) relative to
not attending, church attendance is positively related to a woman’s social
network support and aid from co-religionists, (ii) aid from co-religionists
is associated with increased family size, while (iii) fertility declines with
extra-religious social network support. Moreover, while extra-religious
social network support decreased over time, co-religionist aid remained con-
stant. These findings suggest that religious and secular networks differ
in their longevity and have divergent influences on a woman’s fertility.
We find some suggestive evidence that support to mothers and aid from
co-religionists is positively associated with a child’s cognitive ability at
later stages of development. Findings provide mixed support for the premise
that ritual, such as church attendance, is part of a strategy that returns high
levels of support, fertility and improved child outcomes. Identifying the
diversity and scope of cooperative breeding strategies across global religions
presents an intriguing new horizon in the evolutionary study of religious
systems.
This article is part of the theme issue ‘Ritual renaissance: new insights
into the most human of behaviours’.
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21. Introduction
At first glance, the possibility that religious rituals [1] are
functional seems unlikely. Tribal dances, community sacrifi-
cial offerings and contemporary Christian church services
appear to involve significant energetic, material and temporal
investments that could be more directly invested in somatic
maintenance, status competition and/or reproduction [2].
Yet, the ubiquity [3], persistence and historical depth of col-
lective religious rituals are all indicative of functionality [4].
Resolving this paradox is a major challenge in the social
sciences, and a substantial body of literature highlights the
social functions of rituals. This literature has, however, lar-
gely not addressed how the cooperative social relationships,
fostered through ritual behaviour, can directly impact
biological fitness.
Scholars across several disciplines have proposed that
participation in rituals mitigates selective pressures associated
with group living [4–9]. By living socially, individuals attain,
among other things, greater and more efficient resource pro-
duction [4]. At the same time, sociality leaves individuals
vulnerable to exploitation by conspecifics [10]. Under such
conditions, collective resources are more likely to emerge and
stabilize when individuals can reliably communicate their
commitment to group goals that motivate collective action
and resource production [11–16].
Specifically, participation in ritual may function as a
reliable communicative signal of an individual’s trustworthi-
ness, and commitment to shared group objectives [4,6,17].
Energetic investments in ritual behaviour can, in other
words, help ensure its communicative reliability and therefore
protect the group, and its resources, from exploitation by out-
siders. That is, in return for investments in ritual behaviour,
individuals benefit materially from subsequent cooperation.
Demonstrations of commitment through ritual can also serve
to increase a person’s status within the group [18]. Cooperative
and/or status gains returned from the enactment of ritual be-
haviour are expected to positively impact an individual’s
reproductive success [19–21].
Despite empirical findings showing that ritual partici-
pation increases reputational standing [22], improves trust
[23–26] and returnsmaterial benefits in the form of cooperation
[27–32], studies have yet to examine how these cooperative
benefits affect an individual’s reproductive success [33,34].
Two critical facts make this empirical oversight all the more
surprising: (i) there is a consistent positive association between
an individual’s frequency of ritual behaviour and her/his total
offspring [35–38], and (ii) compared to our primate relatives,
human mothers receive high levels of help with childrearing
[39–41]. We therefore hypothesize that a key resource gener-
ated by religious groups is alloparental support to mothers
[33,34]. We discuss these points in turn.
(a) Cooperative support to mothers: from foragers to
modern nation states
By virtue of earlier weaning and shorter interbirth intervals,
human females achieve higher fertility compared to our great
ape relatives [42–44]. The cooperative breeding hypothesis
contends that high fertility among human females is accom-
plished, in part, through significant investments in children
by individuals other than the mother (i.e. alloparents)
[39,40,45–47]. Indeed, cross-cultural studies find that kin andnon-kin make substantial contributions to children, and that
these investments positively impact child survival and
women’s total fertility [41,48]. Though empirical work finds
that the majority of alloparenting comes from kin, particularly
maternal kin, there is considerable ecological variation associ-
ated with alloparenting and flexibility in who helps mothers
[41,43,48,49].
Recent socio-economic changes (e.g. urbanization, reliance
upon market economies, increased schooling and access to
healthcare) have resulted in substantial reductions to human
fertility [50,51], as part of the demographic transition from
high fertility and high mortality to low fertility and low
mortality [52]. Evolutionary anthropologists have suggested
that these declines in fertility can be partially attributed
to lower levels of support available to mothers in post-
industrial environments [53,54]. As societies undergo economic
transitions, kin networks––and the support they provide
mothers––break down as individuals disperse over larger
geographical ranges in pursuit of economic opportunities
[46,48,55–58]. Indeed, compared to pre-industrialized popu-
lations, children in post-industrial societies receive less
investment from kin, particularly older siblings, cousins,
aunts and uncles [41]. However, despite an overall reduction
in available support, parents in post-industrial environments
invest substantially more in individual offspring than in
pre-demographic transition environments [56,59].
Although there is considerable evidence for a relationship
between social support to mothers and their fertility in pre-
transition societies, in post-transition societies, evidence for
the cooperative breeding hypothesis is more ambiguous
[60,61]. Some studies find that support is positively associated
with fertility [62–64], some find no relationship [65,66], while
others find that social support has anti-natal effects [65,67].
Along with major economic and other social changes,
post-industrial subsistence and economic patterns often also
entail the emergence of secularization, and the beginnings of
fertility differentials between religious and secular popu-
lations, with the former, in general, exhibiting higher fertility
than the latter [33]. Although there have been several cross-
cultural studies of social support and fertility across societies,
few have investigated how religious and secular support
networks may have different effects on a woman’s fertility.
Religious people tend to have higher overall levels of social
support [31,68,69], the number of within-congregational
social ties for mothers increases when she has a child [70],
and mothers receive more social support from co-religionists
than non-mothers [71]. Moreover, childless members of reli-
gious groups tend to engage in more alloparental support
than their demographically similar secular counterparts [33].
It remains unknown, however, whether the higher fertility of
religious individuals in post-industrial environments is a
result of this greater social support.
Without higher levels of support, wewould expect children
born to religious parents to exhibit reduced success, owing to
larger sibships and a resultant reduction or dilution of parental
resources. Indeed, in post-transition societies, family size is
associated with a reduction in per-child parental investment
and offspring physiological and cognitive outcomes [72–75].
Both evolutionary [33] and economic theories [76–78],
however, posit that religious individuals in post-industrial
societies may be partially buffered from the effects of resource
dilution to offspring, given higher levels of alloparental
support [33]. For example, cross-culturally, sibling number is
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off is weakened, and even non-existent, among some religious
groups [77,78]. It has been hypothesized that reduced trade-
offs between family size and child success in school, among
some religious groups, is the result of the higher relative
levels of social support available to mothers in these groups
[77]. To date, however, it is unknown whether higher levels
of support to mothers in religious communities is sufficient
to reduce the strength of trade-offs between child number
and child development outcomes.
Using 10 years of data collected among mothers living in
the UK, we tested the following predictions:
P1: frequency of maternal church attendance is positively
associated with social network support, as well as aid
from co-religionists;
P2: frequency of maternal church attendance is positively
associated with a mother’s fertility;
P3: social network support and aid from co-religionists
are positively related to a mother’s fertility, even after
adjusting for church attendance; and
P4: social network support and aid from co-religionists is
positively associated with child development outcomes.
2. Methods
(a) Sample and participants
Here, we analyse data from the Avon Longitudinal Study of
Parents and Children (ALSPAC), a panel study of focal children
and their parents, living around the city of Bristol, England
[79,80]. Initially, the ALSPAC sample recruited pregnant women
with an expected delivery date that fell between 1 April 1991
and 31 December 1992, and who were resident in one of three
health administration districts within the South-West Regional
Health Authority that became the ‘Bristol & District Health Auth-
ority’. Mothers of 14 541 pregnancies were recruited prior to birth
during 1990–1992, children from an additional 452 pregnancies
were added to the study 7 years later, and children resulting
from another 254 pregnancies were added 8–18 years later. Of
these 15 257 pregnancies, 14 775 children were live-born, and 14
701 were alive at 1 year. A description of the study and the
study population are available from the ALSPAC website
(http://www.bristol.ac.uk/alspac/) and elsewhere [79,80].
We examine data collected from mothers and a focal child
during the child’s first 10 years of life. Following previous studies
using the ALSPAC database [72,73], prior to analyses we removed
children from multiple births, children who died or experienced
siblingdeath, and children livingwith fostered or adopted children.
Childrenwho had step-siblings living in the homewere included in
analyses. Additional cases were removed if the mother figure was
listed as absent or not the biological mother, if the mother indicated
that she had no biological children livingwith her, if themother ever
indicated shewas in a lesbian relationship, or if shewas in a relation-
ship with someone other than the biological father at the time of the
focal child’s birth. All other cases of biological father absence were
included, though father absence was controlled for in analyses.
This left data from 13 446 children and their mothers for analysis.
Owing to missing data, the number of mothers and children
included in models varied between 1766 to 8209, depending on
the variables specified in the model and their rates of missing data.
(b) Variables and data processing
The studywebsite contains details of all data through a fully search-
able data dictionary and variable search tool (http://www.bristol.
ac.uk/alspac/researchers/our-data/). The ALSPAC codes for allvariables used in the current analyses are described in the electronic
supplementary material, table S1.
A difficulty in using the ALSPAC dataset is that it contains
high rates of missing data. The raw dataset for our main analyses,
described in table 1, contained 834 503 measured values (not
including year or participant identities (IDs)), and 940 369 missing
values. The greatest source of missing data in this dataset is owing
to variables not being measured at the same time points. For
example, the variable on mothers’ social support networks is not
measured in years eight or ten, whereas measurements of child’s
height are. Note, too, that variables tend to be measured less fre-
quently at later time points in the study (table 1). Missing data
owing to the ALSPAC study not measuring variables in a given
year accounts for 631 962 (67%) of all missing data in our main
dataset. This presents a challenge for multivariate models that
include variables measured at different time points.
Other reasons for missing data include a mother or child
declining to answer a specific question, being recruited to the
sample at a later time point, or being unavailable to take part in
the study at a specific point in time. Such attrition can introduce
biases that result in a less representative sample.
To address themethodological challenges associatedwithmiss-
ing data and to reduce the effects of potentially biased attrition, we
performed imputation for all predictor variables in the study, as
well as for mother’s fertility (an outcome in one of our models).
Our imputation approach started by imputing missing values
between known values, assuming linear change between those
points. Any remaining missing values were then replaced with
the nearest known recorded value. For example, if a mother was
recorded as having one child in year one, and two children in
year six, but no other recorded values, our method would impute
one child in years two and three, and two children for any missing
years thereafter. If a mother or child had no recorded values for a
variable, no imputation was performed. This imputation strategy
enabled us to analyse variables that are not recorded at the same
time points and minimized potential biases that could arise
owing to biased attrition by providing principled estimates for
missing cases. To test how sensitive our findings are to this imputa-
tion strategy, we performed additional analyses without any
imputation, and using an alternative imputation strategy (electronic
supplementary material, methods). The results of these models are
substantively identical to those of our main analyses (electronic
supplementary material, table S12). The cognitive development
dataset was not imputed over time because the outcome variables
are tied to child performance in a single year. Instead, for these
models, we assigned values to predictor variables using the last
knownmeasurement value and did not impute cognitive perform-
ance outcomes. We also did not impute measures of child height
owing to the nonlinear and varying nature of child growth rates.
The full code used to impute missing data is provided on the
Open Science Framework (OSF) project page (https://osf.io/
4mt9y/), and we provide summary tables of the raw (table 1) and
imputed data (electronic supplementarymaterial, tables S2 and S3).
(i) Outcome variables
We performed a series of four analyses to test each of our four pre-
dictions. Our first series of analyses examined mothers’ social
support using two measures––a composite measure of social
network support drawn from the sum of 10 questions (see the elec-
tronic supplementary material, methods) and a binary measure of
aid from co-religionists. The social network support measure was
used as a proxy for general social support, and assessed a mother’s
potential to draw practical and emotional support, as well as fre-
quency of contact with kin, in-laws and friends. The aid from co-
religionists variable was derived from the question, ‘Do you
obtain help and support from members of your religious group?’
Aid from co-religionists, therefore, represents ongoing practical
aid, whereas the social network support composite variable is
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6constructed largely from questions about the size of the potential
support network, with some questions which may reflect the pro-
vision of emotional, but not practical, support. Our second series
of analyses examined mother’s fertility, which was operationalized
as her number of offspring for each of the 10 years in the study,
including those children she had at the start of the study. Our
third series of analyses examined children’s physiological develop-
ment, operationalized as focal child height in centimetres. Our
fourth series of analyses investigated child cognitive performance,
operationalized with scores on compulsory national tests: upon
entering school at age 5–6 (entry assessment), at age 6–7 (stage 1
assessment) and at age 8 (the WISC-III [81]). Full model specifica-
tions are outlined in the electronic supplementary materials,
and the code used to perform analyses is available on the OSF
project page.
(ii) Predictor variables
We here define ritual as ‘the performance of more or less invariant
sequences of formal acts and utterances not entirely encoded by
the performers’ [1, p. 24]. Church services, which typically involve
the recitation of formalized prayers, singing of hymns and stand-
ing and sitting at prescribed moments, are among the most
frequently performed rituals across human cultures today [82].
To operationalize ritual investments, we used a four-level ordi-
nal measure of frequency of attendance at a house of worship
(none, at least once a year, monthly or weekly), which in this
sample consistedmainly of Christian church attendance and is here-
after referred to as church attendance. We initially investigated the
relationship between other aspects of religion, including belief
and religious identification, and a mother’s fertility, but found
little evidence of such relationships (see the electronic supplemen-
tary material, table S11). To assess the impact of the presence of a
mother’s partner on her fertility, models included a dichotomous
measure indicating whether or not a mother’s partner resided
in her household. We also included a continuous measure of
mother’s number of step-children in the household in relevant
models. Mother’s work was assessed as number of hours worked
per week. All models included household income as a measure of
social status. We investigated the inclusion of other status measures,
but owing to concerns of multicollinearity, added only household
income as it was most highly correlated with all other status
measures. Mother’s education (a categorical variable with five
levels) was also included as a covariate as it is known to be related
to her fertility. Mother’s age (in years), child’s ethnicity and child’s
sex were coded at birth and included as controls. Ethnicity was
coded as 0 = for non-white ethnicity, and 1 =white ethnicity (see
table 1 and the electronic supplementary material for more detail
regarding ethnicity in this sample), and the focal child’s sex was
coded as 0 = female, 1 =male. In the models examining focal child
developmental outcomes, sibling number was calculated by sub-
tracting 1 from a mother’s total fertility in each year after the child
was born. Further details of all variables are provided in the elec-
tronic supplementary material, S1.2.
(iii) Analyses
Across all analyses we built multivariate, multilevel Bayesian
models subsequently assessedwith the brmspackage [83] in R, ver-
sion 3.6.0 [84]. Participant ID and year were included as varying
effects in all analyses. Forourmodels onmother’s fertility, social net-
work support and aid from coreligionists, the number of mothers
included in our analyses varied from 8207 to 8209, with a total of
between 90 277 and 90 299 data points across time. For our
models on cognitive performance, which are each measured at a
single time point, the number of children ranged from 1766 to
5814. For our models on child height, there were 6561 children
included, with a total of 29 513 height measurements recorded
across time points. The size and diversity of our sample warranted
the use of uninformative priors in allmodels.We fittedmodelswith
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Figure 1. Results of models predicting mother’s social network support (a), and aid from co-religionists (b). Coefficients include 95% confidence intervals. Note:
social network support is scaled in model 2.
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7mother’s fertilityas the outcomewithaPoissondistribution,models
with help/support from co-religionists as the outcome with a Ber-
noulli distribution, and models with religious attendance, social
network support, height and cognitive ability measures as out-
comes with Gaussian distributions. To aid in interpretation and
mixing, we mean-centred mother’s age, number of step-children
in her household, her weekly hours of work, her education (i.e. a
one unit change in education represents a change in education
level––see the electronic supplementary material) and household
income (i.e. a one unit change in income represents an additional
100GBPperweek in income), andwe scaled social network support
(i.e. a one unit change in social support represents a standard devi-
ation movement on the social support scale). In the height models,
sibling numberwas centred at themean. All data processing scripts
are available on the OSF project page.
We assessed multicollinearity by building general linear
models and examining the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for
each predictor in the models. All VIFs were less than 1.4, indicat-
ing that multicollinearity was not an issue [85]. For all models,
we ran five chains at 2000 iterations per chain, with the first
500 iterations set as a warmup period. All Ř values were between
1.00 and 1.02, indicating chain convergence in all models. Model
diagnostics are available on the project’s OSF page.
We performed follow-up analyses investigating the inter-
action between mothers’ frequency of church attendance and
each of the social support measures for our models predicting
mothers’ fertility, child cognitive performance and child height.
The results of these models are provided in the electronic sup-
plementary material tables S5–S6 and S8–S10.3. Results
Of the 13 446 mothers who comprised our dataset, at the birth
of the focal child, 9396 (70%) reported a religious affiliation,
and 1680 (12%) reported no affiliation (with missing datafrom the remaining 2370 mothers). Most religious women
belonged to the Church of England (7141; 53%), with the
second and third largest groups reporting Catholic (925; 7%)
or other Christian (772; 6%) affiliations. We focus here on the
relationship between church attendance and social network
support, aid from co-religionists, and a child’s height and cog-
nitive ability. In each of the following sections, we discuss how
the results of our models relate to each of our hypotheses.(a) Is frequency of maternal church attendance
positively associated with a mother’s social network
support, and/or aid from co-religionists?
Time since the focal child’s birth year was associated with a
decrease in a mother’s social network support (−0.10, 95%
confidence intervals (CI) = [−0.15, −0.05]), indicating that
mother’s social network support decreased as the focal
child aged (electronic supplementary material, table S4,
model 1; figure 1a). Yearly (0.15, 95% CI = [0.11, 0.20]),
monthly (0.18, 95% CI = [0.11, 0.26]) and weekly (0.23, 95%
CI = [0.02, 0.34]) church attendance were all related to greater
support relative to mothers who never attend church, though
there were no meaningful differences between these different
levels of church attendance and social network support.
Mothers’ education (0.51, 95% CI = [0.44, 0.58]), household
income (0.10, 95% CI = [0.07, 0.13]) and ethnicity (white;
1.11, 95% CI = [0.73, 1.49]) were also associated with increased
social network support. Mother’s age (−0.07, 95% CI = [−0.09,
−0.06]) and partner presence (−0.30, 95% CI = [−0.38, −0.22])
were negatively associated with social network support.
There was no evidence of an association between the
sex of the focal child (−0.10, 95% CI = [−0.24, 0.05]), or
white ethnicity
partner presence
child sex (1 = male)
income
education
age
hours work (weekly)
aid from co-religonists
social network support
church (weekly)
church (monthly)
partners children
church (yearly)
year
−0.10 0 0.10 0.20
Figure 2. Results of models predicting a mother’s fertility. Coefficients
include 95% confidence intervals.
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8working hours (0.00, 95% CI = [0.00, 0.00]) on mothers’ social
network support.
In contrast with social network support, time since the focal
child’s birth was not associated with a change in the likelihood
of aid from co-religionists (0.02, 95% CI = [−0.05, 0.08]) (elec-
tronic supplementary material, table S4, model 2; figure 1b),
indicating that as focal children aged, help to religiousmothers’
remained consistent. Holding all else constant, church attend-
ance at the yearly (2.21, 95% CI = [1.96, 2.47]), monthly (6.07,
95% CI = [5.77, 6.36]) and weekly (8.88, 95% CI = [8.56, 9.21])
levels were all associated with an increase in the probability
of mothers receiving aid from other members of their religious
group, when compared tomotherswho never attended church.
A mother’s age (0.10, 95% CI = [0.07, 0.14]) was positively
associated with aid from co-religionists, while being an ethnic
minority (−1.48, 95% CI = [−2.15, −0.79]), and household
income was negatively associated with aid from co-religionists
(−0.13, 95% CI = [−0.22, −0.04]). Partner presence was associ-
ated (0.32, 95% CI = 0.10, 0.64]) with an increased likelihood
of co-religionist aid.
Together, these results suggest that the more frequently
mothers attend church, the greater their social network support
and the more likely they are to receive aid from co-religionists.
(b) Is the frequency of maternal church attendance
positively associated with fertility?
Mother’s monthly (0.04, 95% CI = [0.01, 0.06]) and weekly
(0.07, 95% CI = [0.04, 0.10]) church attendance were both
associated with an increase in her fertility, though there was
no reliable association between attending church yearly and a
woman’s fertility (0.00, 95% CI = [−0.01, 0.02]) (electronic sup-
plementary material, table S5, model 1; figure 2). Mother’s
education (−0.04, 95% CI = [−0.05, −0.03]) was negatively
associatedwith her fertility. The presence of amother’s partner
(0.07, 95% CI = [0.04, 0.09]), presence of partner’s children
(0.18, 95% CI = [0.15, 0.20] and mother’s age (0.02, 95%
CI = [0.02, 0.02]) were all positively associatedwith her fertility.
With an average age of 28 and a s.d. of less than 5, and with
sample participants moving through peak (Western) fertility
over the decade under study, we expect a greater effect from
time (0.07, 95% CI = [0.01, 0.13]), than mother’s age at the
focal child’s birth, which is what we observe here. A mother’s
household income (0.00, 95% CI = [−0.01, 0.01]), her working
hours (0.00, 95% CI = [0.00, 0.00]) and the focal child’s sex
(0.01, 95% CI = [−0.01, 0.02]) were not reliably associated
with changes in a woman’s fertility. Women of white ethnicity
tended to have more children (0.05, 95% CI = [0.00, 0.09]).
These results provide support for the hypothesis that reli-
gious attendance is positively associatedwith amother’s fertility.
(c) Is a mother’s social network support, and/or aid
from co-religionists positively related to her fertility?
Aid from co-religionists was positively associated with a
mother’s fertility (0.04, 95%CI = [0.01, 0.06]), while themeasure
of mothers’ social network support was negatively associated
with her fertility (−0.02, 95% CI = [−0.03, −0.01]) (electronic
supplementary material, table S5, model 1; figure 2).
Results indicate that mothers who receive more help from
co-religionists tend to have more children than mothers who
receive less help from co-religionists. How large is the effect
of alloparental support from co-religionists on fertility?Figure 3b plots the predicted effects of aid from co-religionists
over time. In order to understand these effects in practical
terms, we can compare the expected effect of aid from co-
religionists when all other model terms are set to their
mean. Over 10 years, women can expect to have 2.36 chil-
dren. Women who attend church weekly are expected to
have 2.53 children, and among them, those who receive aid
from co-religionists are expected to have 2.64 children.
(d) Is a mother’s social network support and/or aid
from co-religionists positively associated with child
physiological and cognitive development?
Neither a mother’s social support (0.01, 95% CI = [−0.08,
0.05]) nor aid from co-religionists (−0.14, 95% CI = [−0.31,
0.03]) was related to a child’s height (electronic supplemen-
tary material, table S6; model 1). Replicating previous
findings [72], models show a negative association between
a child’s number of siblings and the child’s height (−0.24,
95% CI = [−0.32, −0.16]). There was no association between
the number of step-siblings in the household and a child’s
height (0.10, 95% CI = [−0.11, 0.31]).
There were small but discernable associations between a
child’s height and a mother’s yearly (0.11, 95% CI = [0.01,
0.21]) and monthly (0.16, 95% CI = [0.00, 0.32]), but not
weekly church attendance (0.19, 95% CI = [−0.03, 0.42]). There
was a small positive relationship between a mother’s hours of
work and a child’s height (0.01, 95% CI = [0.01, 0.02]). Children
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Figure 3. Key predictors of mothers fertility over 10 years of the study: (a) illustrates predicted number of children among mothers by mother’s church attendance;
(b) illustrates the predicted number of children depending on whether mothers receive aid from co-religionists; and (c) illustrates predicted number of children by social
network support; minimum shows the predicted number of children for the lowest observed level of social network support found in our dataset; mean illustrates the predicted
number of children for the mean level of social network support observed in our dataset, and maximum illustrates the predicted number of children for the highest level of
social network support observed in our dataset. All three of these figures are based on the coefficients estimated electronic supplementary material, table S5.
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9of white ethnicity (−0.92, 95% CI = [−1.59, −0.23]) tended to be
shorter. There was also a negative association between a
mother’s household income and child height over time
(−0.08, 95% CI = [−0.15, −0.01]). A mother’s education was
not related to her child’s height (−0.07, 95% CI = [−0.19,
0.05]), nor was there an association between a mother’s part-
ner’s presence and a child’s height (0.18, 95% CI = [−0.02,
0.38]). Mother’s height was positively associated with child
height (0.32, 95% CI = [0.30, 0.34]), and boys grew taller than
girls (0.71, 95% CI = [0.47, 0.96]).
In terms of cognitive development measures, a mother’s
social support was not related to a child’s entry level assess-
ment (0.14, 95% CI = [−0.14, 0.42]), but was positively related
to scores on both the stage 1 assessment (0.19, 95% CI = [0.10,
0.28]) and the WISC-III (0.63, 95% CI = [0.19, 1.07]) (electronic
supplementary material, table S7; figure 4). There was no
relationship between aid from co-religionists to mothers and
a child’s entry level assessment (0.42, 95% CI = [−0.75, 1.61]),
nor the stage 1 assessment (0.11, 95% CI = [−0.26, 0.47),
but there was a positive association between aid from co-
religionists and the WISC-III (2.33, 95% CI = [0.72, 4.01]).
There was a negative effect of sibling number on entry assess-
ment scores (−0.33, 95% CI = [−0.65, −0.01]), on the stage 1
assessment (−0.34, 95% CI = [−0.44, −0.25]) and the WISC-III
(−1.34, 95% CI = [−1.81, −0.88]). There was no evidence of a
relationship between step-siblings in the household and a
child’s score on the entry level assessment (0.83, 95% CI = [−
0.64, 2.30]), stage 1 assessment (0.12, 95% CI = [−0.56, 0.39]),
nor the WISC-III (0.31, 95% CI = [−1.46. 2.16]).
The number of hours a mother spent working was not
reliably related to a child’s performance on the entry level
assessment (−0.08, 95% CI = [−0.29, 0.13]), but was negatively
related to a child’s stage 1 assessment (−0.14, 95% CI = [−0.20,
−0.08]) and WISC-III (−0.68, 95% CI = [−0.98, −0.38]) scores.
A mother’s education was positively related to a child’s entry
level assessment (0.71, 95% CI = [0.45, 0.96]), stage 1 assess-
ment (0.66, 95% CI = [0.57, 0.74]) and WISC-III (3.95, 95%
CI = [3.55, 4.35]). Household incomewas also positively relatedto child’s entry level assessment (0.80, 95% CI = [0.52, 1.07]),
stage 1 assessment (0.50, 95% CI = [0.41, 0.58]) and WISC-III
(1.95, 95% CI = [1.52, 2.39]). Boys scored lower on entry level
assessments (−2.30, 95%CI = [−2.82,−1.77]) and stage 1 assess-
ments (−0.99, 95% CI = [−1.15, −0.82]), but there were no
differences between the sexes on the WISC-III (0.17, 95%
CI = [−0.64, 0.99]). The presence of mother’s partner in
the home did not influence a child’s entry level (−0.46,
95% CI = [−1.69, 0.74]) or stage 1 assessment (−0.20, 95%
CI = [−0.52, 0.11]), though there is evidence of a negative
relationship between mother’s partner’s presence and a
child’s WISC-III score (−2.11, 95% CI = [−3.79, −0.44]). Chil-
dren of older mothers scored higher on the WISC-III (0.28,
95% CI = [0.18, 0.38]) and the stage 1 assessment (0.04, 95%
CI = [0.02, 0.06]), but there is no evidence of a relationship
between a mother’s age and a child’s performance on the
entry level assessment (0.03, 95% CI = [−0.04, 0.09]). There
was no relationship between a child’s ethnicity and any of
the three test scores.
Together, these findingsprovideonly limited support forour
hypotheses. Most models showed no relationships between
ritual attendance, aid from co-religionists or social support and
child outcomes. However, when associations were found, all
were in the predicted direction,which provides some suggestive
evidence to support our hypotheses: aid fromco-religionists and
mother’s social network supportwere positively associatedwith
small differences inperformanceonmeasuresof cognitivedevel-
opment at later stages of child maturity. The results showing
positive associations between church attendance and child
height aredifficult to interpret, given that aid fromco-religionists
was not associated with height.4. Discussion
Our results suggest that church attendance is positively
associated with social support and aid from co-religionists,
and that aid from co-religionists is associated with increased
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Figure 4. Results of models predicting a child’s performance on three standardized measures of cognitive ability. Coefficients include 95% confidence intervals.
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10fertility and may also be associated with improvements in
some child outcomes. We caution that the findings reported
here do not definitively establish causality. Rather, the obser-
vations are consistent with the hypothesis that engaging in
religious rituals helps build social support networks with
co-religionists, and that support from co-religionists increases
fertility and may improve some aspects of child development.
Although fertility levels in post-industrial populations are
known to vary with religious group membership and ritual
participation, these relationships have rarely been subjected
to sustained evolutionary theorizing and empirical investi-
gation [86–89]. We predicted that higher relative fertility
among religious individuals in post-industrial environments
is, in part, enabled by greater alloparental support available
to mothers in these communities. Specifically, we predicted
that mothers who attend church more frequently benefit
from larger and higher quality social networks, and aid from
co-religionists, and that increased support is associated with
larger family sizes over time. Indeed, we found an overall posi-
tive relationship between church attendance and both social
support and aid from co-religionists, and a positive relation-
ship between aid from co-religionists and a woman’s fertility.
Though church attendance was associated with higher levelsof social network support, we did not find reliable differences
in social support among mothers who attended at different
frequencies. Additionally, we found an overall negative
relationship between a mother’s social network support and
her fertility. These findings suggest that religious and non-
religious social networks may have opposing influences on
fertility in line with some previous findings [53,54]. However,
how religious and secular networks might differ, and why
they have different relationships with fertility beyond allopar-
ental support, remain unclear—and our ability to further
disentangle these relationships with the current data is limited.
Evolutionary theorists have predicted that human repro-
ductive decision-making evolved to facultatively respond to
local levels of available alloparental support [74]. However,
the specific features of social support that influence fertility
decisions remain unclear, and indeed, different kinds of
social support have been found to differentially affect fertility.
For example, among a UK sample, emotional support was
found to have a positive association with transitions to a
second child, while practical support was negatively related
to second births [60]. Other studies have found associations
between transitions to second births and frequency of contact
with family members [90] and in-laws [91]. Recent work has
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11found that in addition to kin support, the likelihood of receiv-
ing alloparental support is influenced by having given support
[90] (i.e. alloparenting is often reciprocal). In the current study,
social support is measured through questions that assessed a
mother’s potential to draw practical and emotional support,
as well as frequency of contact with kin, in-laws and friends.
We found an overall negative association between thismeasure
of social support and fertility. Scholars have suggested that a
negative relationship between support and total fertility in
post-industrial environments may be the result of women
with young children using social support to return to work,
rather than to have more children [92]. However, we found
that a negative relationship between social support and fertility
holds after adjusting for mother’s working hours. It is possible
that over timemotherswithmore childrenwithdraw socially in
order to focus on childrearing; indeed, we found that mothers
in the ALSPAC sample had lower levels of social support as
the focal child aged. That is, rather than high levels of social
support affecting declines in fertility, the negative relationship
between social support and fertility we find here may be the
result of mothers’ greater focus on childrearing, at the expense
of sociality, as her children age. By contrast, aid from co-religio-
nists remained consistent over time, which suggests that
relative to secular mothers, religious mothers retain higher
levels of sociality, and support from their social groups, as
their children age.
In post-industrial environments, increased family size is
associated with decreased child development outcomes
[72–74,93]. The ALSPAC data analysed here have previously
been used to demonstrate a trade-off between number of off-
spring and offspring developmental outcomes [72,94], and to
show that parental investment in a child is inversely related
to a child’s number of siblings [73]. If the trade-off between off-
spring outcomes and offspring quantity is owing to a dilution
of parental resources, then parents who can draw resources
from larger and stronger support networks can be expected
to be partially buffered from these trade-offs. Our models
reveal a negative relationship between sibling number and a
child’s height and performance on cognitive assessments,
and that social support to mothers and aid from co-religionists
is positively associated with some scores on cognitive tests at
later stages of development. These findings are by no means
conclusive, given that not all of our models showed the pre-
dicted positive relationship between support and child
outcomes, but do provide suggestive evidence that mother’s
support networks may buffer the detrimental effects of sibling
number on child development.(a) Limitations of the present study
We acknowledge that there are a number of limitations in this
study. First, we emphasize that we do not treat the cognitive
ability measures we analysed here as truly objective measures
of a child’s success. The measures of cognitive ability we used
are standardized tests that are known to contain ethnic and
socio-economic biases that favour white and wealthy children
[95,96], and indeed our models reveal the effects of a child’s
household income and mother’s education on a child’s scores
(though we find no evidence of an ethnic bias). Despite such
biases, these scores may predict a child’s success in the par-
ticular environment they are administered, and where similar
social biases persist throughout a child’s life. Research suggests
that scores of cognitive ability are positively associated withlater educational success [97,98] and adult socio-economic
status, even after adjusting for ethnicity and the socio-economic
status of the household in which a person was raised [99]. In
other words, our findings suggest that the larger relative
social resources available to religious mothers in England
may positively impact a child’s socio-economic success into
adulthood. Indeed, social success is probably more fitness
relevant than small differences in individual height.
Second, it is likely that other features of religions beyond
social support also affect offspring outcomes among religious
mothers; specifically, religious mothers may be able to provide
more parental investment than secular mothers. In Wester-
nized settings, the parents of religious children are more
likely to stay married [100] and be more cooperative in child-
care [101]. Cross-culturally, religious women are less likely to
work than secular women [102]. These factors suggest that reli-
gious women may have more time and resources to invest in
children than secular mothers; however, whether they do,
and how this impacts child outcomes, remains an open ques-
tion. The ALSPAC data used in this study do not allow for
an examination of the influence of traditional gender norms
in fertility decisions. However, we find that after adjusting
for number of mother’s hours of work, religious mothers still
have more children, which suggests that more than traditional
gender norms regarding mothers’ work/domestic life are
driving the findings reported here.
Third, in addition to social support and parental invest-
ment, religious and secular social networks differ in many
ways that may proximately influence fertility differentials.
Many religions are pro-natal, and internalization of these
values could increase fertility [103]. Individuals in secular
social networks, by contrast, often endorse anti-natal views
that could decrease fertility [54,104]. Moreover, differences in
secular and religious norms related to abortion [105], ideal
family size [106] and contraception [107] may influence
differences in fertility between the religious and non-religious.
Fourth, it is possible that the positive relationship between
aid from co-religionists and family size we find here is driven
by increased exposure topro-natal norms rather thanbyallopar-
ental support to mothers. Because of the lack of assessment of
norms related to family size in the ALSPAC study, however,
we cannot directly examine the relative effects of pro/anti-
natal norms on mothers’ fertility in this sample. Yet if our find-
ings were driven by norms, and exposure to pro-natal norms
occurs primarily in the context of ritual (through religious teach-
ings, for example), then we would not expect to find the
additional effects of aid from co-religionists on fertility reported
above. Rather than representing an alternative set of hypoth-
eses, it could be that both normative differences between
religious and secular mothers as well as differences in practical
support could be influencing differences in fertility between
these groups. If the higher relative fertility of religious individ-
uals is driven primarily by norms, however, they are unlikely
to provide any buffer to offspring development without conco-
mitant norms for cooperative support to mothers. Indeed, the
effects of religious/secular norms on fertility, and how these
may affect family size relative to, or in conjunction with,
cooperative support remains a critical area for future research.
Fifth, a potential issue with analyses that test whether sup-
port (from kin, non-kin or co-religionists) is associated with
improved child outcomes is that they assume that all mothers
are the same except that some have access to additional support
while others do not. Instead, it may be that mothers who
royalsocietypublishing.org/journal/rstb
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12receive support from co-religionists are compensating for lack
of support, or other disadvantages, in other areas of their
lives. In other words, a lack of evidence that support improves
child outcomes does not necessarily mean that support does
not improve child outcomes––children may have been worse
off in the absence of that support, if their mothers belong to a
particularly disadvantaged group.
Sixth, there is panel attrition in the ALSPAC data, which
could, in theory, bias results. Specifically, for attrition to bias
our results it would need to be uneven with respect to mechan-
isms we posit here: i.e. religious mothers who receive social
support but have fewer children would need to drop out of
the study at a higher rate than non-religious mothers and reli-
gious mothers who do not receive social support and yet have
more children. Previous analyses have concluded that women
with complications at the focal pregnancy, those of low socio-
economic status (particularly those with inadequate housing),
and those with low levels of social support were more likely
to drop out of the study [80]. Thus, attrition owing to these
inequalities resulted in a less representative sample, and with
respect to social support, our findings may underestimate the
effects of social support on fertility, as most women in the data-
set we analysed here had relatively high levels of social support.
Selective attrition also probably results in an underestimation of
later educational outcomes for children [108], which indicates
that the negative effect of sibling number on cognitive perform-
ance may be greater than our models are able to recover.
Finally, the social supportmeasures used in this studydonot
disentangle support from kin from support from non-kin. This
ambiguity limits our ability to test key evolutionary hypotheses
regarding kin versus non-kin effects on fertility. Nonetheless,
our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that women
who attend church receivemore alloparental support than secu-
lar mothers, and this support is associated with higher fertility
and, on some measures, improved child outcomes.5. Conclusion
In conclusion, we tested the hypothesis that one of the func-
tions of church attendance in post-demographic transition
societies is to support a high fertility/high child outcome strat-
egy.We foundmixed support for our predictions. Our analyses
of the ALSPAC data suggest that: (i) church attendance is
associated with more social network support and more practi-
cal help from co-religionists, (ii) help from co-religionists
is associated with higher fertility, and (iii) social networksupport is negatively associatedwith total fertility. The support
mothers draw upon is positively associated with some
measures of cognitive ability at later child ages. To extend
these findings, we encourage researchers to investigate mul-
tiple measures of support available to mothers, to study how
different forms of support influence reproductive decision-
making and child development, and to investigate the relative
role of norms for family size and alloparental cooperation
among and between religious and secular groups. Understand-
ing the relationships between religion, support, fertility, and
child development is key to understanding the function of
ritual in post-industrial environments and the prevalence
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